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Only a fortnight after Soviet tanks arrived on Christmas Day in Kabul, the 
American columnist, sometime presidential speechwriter, and full-time realist, Bill Safire 
(1927-2009), took cudgels with what was touted as the Carter doctrine in The New York 
Times wherein he queried what if the Red Army, should it lose more men and material 
than tolerable during an occupation, were to press further south to ‘clean out the 
sanctuaries’ of Afghans inside Pakistan.1 Zia-ul Haq, till his (still) unsolved  
disappearance in fire, ash, and mangoes, was careful to keep the ‘water in Afghanistan 
boil[ing] at the right temperature.’2 His successors have heeded him when simmering  
both kettles, Afghan and Indian. And while that godless superpower did not violate 
Pakistan’s sovereignty, its god-fearing arch-rival was to do so a generation later at 
Abbotabad. In his touchingly titled, Pakistan: a hard country—favourable, 
unsurprisingly, with Pakistan‘s pseudo-anglicised literati—Anatol Lieven states that the 
unravelling of the house that Jinnah built could occur by the direct footprint of US troops 
on Pakistani soil for it would split the barracks, and, a fortiori, Believers within, into 
pragmatic Pétainists and pious mutineers. Neither Providence nor Jefferson’s ‘manifest 
destiny’ heirs have done anything of the sort. 
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Among the confection of conspiracies purveyed about Zia’s elimination was one 
that both pilot and co-pilot of the ill-fated PAK1 transporter were Twelver Shi‘is who, 
charismatically charged as is their salvational wont, were intent on avenging the killing of 
Shi‘i leaders and followers in an increasingly salafised, Sunni state—an ostensible 
grievance foregrounded in a polarised Pakistan where the rule of law was enforced by an 
unlawful leadership. In reality it was a ‘mad mullah’ on Pakistan’s western front whose 
mesmerised minions sought to export their Islamic interpretation of renewal (tajdid) and 
reform (islah) eastwards, and who were in no mean measure responsible for communal 
carnages now erupting in Karachi and elsewhere. They continue to date. 
Further, in November 1979, it may be pointed out, fell the beginning of the 
Islamic new-year and (fifteenth) century. It also heralded the destruction of the British 
Council and USIS libraries as well as the American embassy in Islamabad. Pakistani 
mobsters, enraged Muslims to a man, had done so upon learning from Khomeini‘s 
calumny broadcast that ‘it is not beyond guessing that this is the work of criminal 
American imperialism’ in reference to the troops who had raided, and therefore defiled, 
the Grand Mosque and its precincts (haram sharif) in Mecca.3 The raiders were Saudi 
forces and the raided Saudi messianists, the former backed up by Pakistan‘s SSG 
commandos specially flown in at Riyadh’s request. The enraged bussed in from 
neighbouring Rawalpindi to do the torching were students, Pakistani and Iranian, 
belonging to the Jama‘at-i Islami and other outfits.4 
But Washington, clearly, is not the only one to have violated the sanctity of 
Pakistan in the early hours of May 2, 2011. A reticent report in The New York Times in 
2010 declared how Iran’s intelligence minister, Heidar Moslehi, laconically announced 
that a Pakistan-based Iranian diplomat absconding for over two years was freed after 
Teheran ‘took the initiative’ in ‘complex intelligence operations’ to secure his release 
pursuant to Pakistan failing in the same.5 A year earlier, in October 2009, eleven 
Revolutionary Guards were arrested for illegally entering Pakistan. This came in the 
wake of the most audacious attack launched by Sunni-Baloch dissidents who go by 
Jundallah (‘soldiers of Allah’) which left dead the Pasdaran’s deputy-commander of 
ground forces plus six senior commanders, nine officers and important tribal chiefs, both 
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Sunni and Shi‘i. Teheran publicly implicated Pakistan, alongside Israel and the United 
States, for this massacre.6 The Guards seriously mulled about urging Islamabad to permit 
them to enter and hunt down those perpetrators. Such cross-border violations, then, now 
and in the offing, cannot be ruled out. Teheran, albeit privately, held Islamabad 
responsible for the 1998 sacking of its Mazar-i Sharif consulate and slaying of eleven 
diplomats (VEVAK operatives in all probability) by the Taliban following which they 
departed to slaughter a large number of Hazara Shi‘is.7 
That Iran could make short shrift of Pakistani sovereignty, predicated on its low 
estimation of Pakistan and Pakistanis, politically and socio-culturally, is stale fare for 
those in the know. Teheran, admittedly, was the first state to recognise the newly-created 
dominion in August 1947. (It may be pointed out here that Afghanistan, unlike Iran, 
opposed the inclusion of Pakistan in the newly-established United Nations.) An Iran- 
Pakistan Friendship Treaty was signed in February 1950 during the Shah’s official state 
visit to its eastern and western wings.8 Pakistan had no national anthem three years into 
its existence. A tune was swiftly adopted given the impending arrival of the Pahlavis. No 
lyrics, however, were available for a further two years until the selection committee 
approved those penned by the famed muhajir poet, Hafeez Jullundhari. Although 
formally recognised as an Urdu paean, the composition is readily intelligible to a Persian 
speaker for only one of its fifteen lines is, strictly, in Urdu while the remaining lyrics are 
but Persian, a satisfactory compromise given that Bengali and Urdu agitators in both 
wings demanded the song to be in their respective language. A national anthem was only 
officially adopted after the Shah’s visit, four years later, in 1954.9 And a national carrier, 
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), was formed a year later, which will be touched 
upon below. 
From the outset, immense store was set by the fact that both Muslim neighbours 
shared historic, geographic, mercantile, spiritual and literary linkages. Pakistan was more 
than enthusiastic to be considered the core region of what is the ancient and medieval 
Indo-Iranian oecumene. It is a contention, admittedly, not unjustified. General surveys in 
publications make this plain, whether scholarly or ‘popular’-official, some of which were 
authored by Pakistani intellectuals, patriots still heady in the first flush of 
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having forged the then largest Muslim polity in the world. It was a given that they— 
muhajirs who had migrated from India to constitute the cerebral cadre of  this new 
Muslim Zion—were keen to distance themselves from their inexorable and unavoidable 
commonalities with the Indian (read Hindu) peninsula and now contrive ties with their 
religious brethren near abroad.10 This precipitous gaze westward has spawned cock-eyed 
Pakistanis whose blind-spots dilated with the injection of Pakistan Studies in the national 
curriculum after 1973, the prescription of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for a dejected citizenry of a 
dismembered society.11 
Much water had flowed under the bridge by then: Imperial Iran was politic 
and sailed a steady course in its relations with Pakistan and its Indian foe. The Iranians, 
actually, were quietly proud of the fact that they had balanced and cordial relations. In a 
democratic, non-aligned India, the moral voice of the Afro-Asian world, the Shah sought 
an effective counterbalance against the radical, anti-royalist rhetoric of Nasser and his 
Arab acolytes.12 But Teheran made clear its stance on Kashmir by culturally couching its 
prejudice as: ‘Ninety per cent of the people of Kashmir are Muslims and have ties of 
common culture, tradition and religion with Iran [which] cannot remain indifferent to  
their lot.’13 Press TV, as an aside, enjoys wide-spread viewership in the Vale or Indian- 
administered Kashmir, whose indignant residents certainly warm to the outbursts of an 
audacious Ahmadinejad disparaging the Holocaust or Muslim munafiqs (‘hypocrites’) 
devoid of credibility and credo (iman), a pervasive notion after the 1979 revolution, 
especially among Pakistanis, both indigenes and working-class expatriates in the Persian 
Gulf sheikhdoms, who glowingly extol the austere ayatollah or modest mayor for their 
principled politics compared to the venality and cupidity of their Arab and Pakistani 
suzerains. 
Iran supported Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 wars against India. The Shah 
favoured Pakistan, materially and psychologically, in its 1965 misadventure. Deeds, not 
words, need not always matter for the latter, when bluntly put, at least convey 
transparency: Sunni, Hanafi Turkey refused to despatch ‘fellow brother’ troops to assist 
Pakistan in September 1965 for its military spokesman declared that, ‘we are keeping 
them for Cyprus.’14   A year earlier, in July 1964, Pakistan had joined Turkey and Iran to 
Country –specific Studies (1) STUDIES on IRAN 
190 
 
 
 
 
form the  Regional  Co-operation  for  Development  (R.C.D.).  Putatively to combat the 
‘Red menace’, all three, non-Arab, Muslim states located along the southern tier of the 
USSR assembled on the platform of shared religio-cultural values only to be distracted 
and dispersed by domestic exigencies or external expediencies. And the harsh realisation 
must have dawned by now on others forming alliances solely calculated on the 
confessional coefficient whose multiplier effect has yielded only embarrassing dividends, 
be it the Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). 
It would be cynical to merely point out R.C.D.’s achievements such as bartering 
Pakistani bananas for Iranian buses; visa-free travel for short stays; reduction in surface 
postal rates to local rates; and travelling exhibitions. A genuine achievement was the 
construction, with West German assistance, of an aluminium smelting plant in Arak, and 
its joint ownership by both governments plus an American corporation.15 Moreover, a 
shaken Shah who had just watched his neighbour descend into civil war in 1971 was 
determined, as was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to prevent Balochistan from ‘doing a Bengal’. 
Bhutto, bolstered after his 1973 state visit to Teheran, launched an all-out assault on the 
provincial leadership, one which lasted until 1978 and in which Iran provided funding   
and hardware appreciably.16 
Road, rail, and sea links among all R.C.D. states were definitely expanded and 
enhanced. Part of the proposed Karachi-Teheran-Ankara ‘Asian Highway’ was 
completed extensively but not entirely.17 A vestige of this era of co-operation is the N-25 
artery between Karachi and Quetta which is still remembered as the RCD highway. An 
air agreement to form a common R.C.D. airline never took off. By now, PIA was a 
success story, even by public sector standards, and, as London‘s Foreign Office noted, it 
was loathe to merge with Iran Air or THY, both of whom had limited international 
networks and prestige than their Pakistani counterpart.18 (These were halcyon years as 
Indians and Pakistanis now ruefully recall PIA’s stewardship under Air Marshal Nur 
Khan and Air India’s under J. R. D. Tata.) 
Pakistani aviation’s superiority was no match for Persian pride in their ‘Great 
Civilisation’ (tamaddun-i buzurg). A point broached by irritated Iranians towards those 
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opposed to their nuclear programme is that it certainly behoves the status of an ancient 
nation with an unbroken historical continuity stretching over three millennia and one 
which has never invaded any of its neighbours for well-nigh half a millennium. These 
historical verities are then followed up by elaborating on a ‘ramshackle Pakistan’ which 
is, ‘corrupt, unstable, historically pro-American and basically artificial nation-state’ 
whose atomic arsenal goes unchallenged.19 These are captious but compelling 
conclusions. 
Turning   to   correctives,   it   merits   rectifying   here   that   the much-maligned 
‘Kalashnikov culture’ berated by Pakistanis was one abetted and funded by not just 
Americans exploiting Pakistan as a cold-war proxy. For it was another sponsor closer 
home who has been responsible since 1979 for the spilling of blood and fomenting bad 
blood between Muslim sectarians. As mentioned earlier, it was Khomeini’s Iran which 
sought to export its theocratic radicalism as well as become the self-styled representative 
of Pakistan’s Shi‘is in the wake of Zia ul-Haq’s avowedly Sunni Islamisation moves.  
Zia’s encouragement to Sunni hardliners, by permitting the Arab funding of militias and 
madrasas, was a direct response to initial Iranian instigation.20 The routine kidnapping  
and murdering of Iranian diplomats, especially during the 1990s, by Sunni militants with 
tacit ISI support, has shifted from urban centres to Balochistan. There the scenario is 
further worsened with persecuted Hazara Shi‘is ensconced among brooding Sunnis 
nursing secessionist tendencies across their linguistic homeland which straddles both 
republics to form the largest province in each of them.21 
Iranian and Pakistani religious minorities, since 1979, in both heterogeneous 
societies, have seen a sharp deterioration in their security and status as a crude and 
narrow exclusivism came to characterise the identities and agendas of both Islamic 
republics. In so doing, non-Muslims in both states, historically long-standing 
communities whose contribution to public life has been completely out of proportion to 
their numerical strength, have chosen to emigrate or exist under immense duress. 
Conversion, a time-honoured option across Muslim lands, is perennially on the cards to 
bypass the bane of fearful or impoverished living. Bahaism and Ahmadism, both 
universal, proselytising faiths deemed heresies by Muslims in the main, have borne the 
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brunt for nearly a century and half. Attempts to decimate them have, thankfully, not 
succeeded. Pakistan, however, is not averse to the presence of Bahais for they openly 
maintain communal and worship centres. Covertly, however, is how Jews reside in 
Pakistan, unlike Iran, where they pass off as Christians or Parsis.22 In Iran they are 
officially recognised and conduct their affairs overtly if precariously. Pakistan indeed is 
unique for even in Arab states Jews do not, indeed need not, seek recourse to 
dissimulation for survival. The predicament of Pakistani Hindus is marginally better than 
that of their Jewish compatriots. Christians and Sikhs in both countries manage tenuously 
if tactfully. Zoroastrians, a penurious remnant in the land of their origin, remain a fast- 
dwindling albeit flourishing minority as Pakistan’s (but also India’s) Parsis.23 But just as 
comfortably placed are Pakistani Isma‘ilis who face numerous restrictions in a Twelver 
Shi‘i Iran. All Pakistani Shi‘is, whether Twelvers or those of other denominations, are 
able to offer worship across the country as well as in Islamabad—modern Teheran, the 
capital of an Islamic republic and former OIC summit venue, lacks a Sunni mosque for 
some 10% of its national populace. Muslim diplomats, predominantly Sunnis, it is 
reported, gather at the Pakistan embassy’s school for offering weekly Friday prayers.24 
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